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Review Essay 
Althusser and History 
Eric Collum 
University of Delaware 
Bennett, Tony. Outside Literature. New York: Routledge, 1990. 
Sprinker, Michael. Imaginary Relations: Aesthetics and Ideology in the 
Theory of Historical Materialism. New York: Verso, 1987. 
Though the authors of both these books are sympathetic to the tradi- 
tional Marxist desire to politicize the aesthetic, they recognize the validity 
of poststructuralism' s challenge to the base-superstructure model that under- 
writes so much of Marxist aesthetics. It is their sympathy with this project 
that prompts them to offer their respective analyses of the vexed dichotomy 
of aesthetics and history. Michael Sprinker wants to keep both terms of this 
dichotomy in play and, proposes to renegotiate the space between them so that 
the aesthetic is no longer considered merely a superstructural reflection of 
the base, history. To this end he argues for an aesthetics that escapes 
historical determination and transforms ideology, and yet still remains a 
quantifiable part of history insofar as it can be studied formally in the 
"material poetic structure" of the work of art. Tony Bennett, on the other 
hand, argues that the aesthetic is a "philosophical" concept that has no place 
in literary criticism; he suggests that literature should be considered, not as 
a "special kind of writing," but as "a historically specific, socially orga- 
nized and maintained field of textual uses and effects" (142). In the end, 
neither author is entirely 'successful in negotiating the difficulties posed by 
the dichotomy o f history and the aesthetic. Sprinker is unable to reconcile the 
formalism of aesthetics with the historical specificity of the work of art, and 
Bennett's reliance on the self-identity of academic institutions throws doubt 
on his ability to separate altogether the aesthetic from literary studies. Both 
projects, it seems to me, would have benefited from an extensive genealogy 
of the aesthetic that would fix, at least provisionally, its history and clarify 
its status in literary institutions. 
Michael Sprinker acknowledges the bourgeois character of traditional 
Marxist aesthetics. He claims that "[c]lassical Marxism shares with bour- 
geois aesthetics the conviction that in art one attains freedom, and that this 
freedom consists, among other things, in the liberation from ideological 
determination and historical determinacy" (13). However, unlike "various 
post-Marxists" (a category in which we might include Bennett), Sprinker 
does not believe that Marxism's complicity with bourgeois aesthetics makes 
Marxism irrelevant. Rather, the author suggests, "What is often dismissively 1
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termed 'bourgeois aesthetics' may well contain the key to a properly 
materialist theory of art" (15). Sprinker rightly criticizes the Marxist/ 
bourgeois aesthetic for its idealism, which encourages its partisans to ignore 
the specificity of the work of art, and for its reliance on a model of 
"reflection," which fails to account for art's intervention in history, or, in 
Jauss's terms, art's "revolutionary character." 
Bennett shares Sprinker's dissatisfaction with the reliance of Marxist 
aesthetics on reflection. But where Sprinker primarily faults this model for 
its subordination of the aesthetic to history, Bennett questions its tendency 
to accept "history" as a pre-discursive given and calls attention to the 
institutional nature of historical and sociological knowledge. For Bennett, 
the object pursued in each discipline (history is studied in history curricu- 
lums, literature in literature curriculums, etc.) does not exist, a priori, 
outside the institution. Instead, each discipline produces its own object(s) of 
knowledge in accordance with different, and apparently separable, rules that 
determine what counts as "true" within a given disciplinary domain. 
Bennett argues that such a system of knowledge production poses certain 
problems for Marxist literary criticism. He claims that though "many of the 
concepts which define the Marxist tradition-the concepts of class, of 
relations of production and social formation, for example"-are essentially 
socio-economic in character, they have been used by critics to master the 
literary text, resulting in an unfortunate mingling of two incompatible sets 
of assumptions (8). Such attempts at totalization on the part of literary critics, 
Marxist and otherwise, have established historical knowledge as the ulti- 
mate referent of the literary text, where issues of interpretation of the latter 
must finally be determined by history. According to Bennett, however, 
literary texts, like historical texts, form part of the archive of an always 
provisional past instead of being merely a reflection or representation of a 
fixed historical reality. This means that literary critics ranging from Louis 
Althusser to Ian Watt who consider history (or sociology) as a "set of real 
conditions and relations" to which literature must ultimately refer (42) are 
making a fundamental category mistake, using the discursive rules of one 
discipline to validate the object of another. 
Besides its commitment to history as the real, Marxist literary theory is, 
for Bennett at least, incapacitated by yet another institutional category error, 
one that leads in the direction of Sprinker's other major complaint against the 
Marxist aesthetic, its idealism. According to Bennett, Marxist literary critics 
have not only used their ill-gotten socio-economic and historical tenets to 
master the literary text, they have also been such poor stewards as to allow 
these concepts to "become entangled with aesthetics through the attempt to 
construe Marxism as capable of providing an alternative theorization of 
literature on the terms established by aesthetic discourse" (8 [my empha- 
sis]), a discourse that Bennett considers essentially "philosophical," rather 
than "literary," in character. 
Though I remain skeptical of its excision of the aesthetic from literary 
criticism, Outside Literature does, I feel, deserve credit for its carefully 2




executed dissection of (especially Marxist) literary critical practice as well 
as its thoughtful demystification of the aesthetic which, it will be readily 
agreed, has often served to perpetuate classist, racist, and sexist politics. 
Throughout, Bennett's main concern is to replace a critical praxis that treats 
the literary text as a "special kind of writing" to be deciphered "in terms 
of the underlying realities [it] express[es]" (141), with one in which 
literature "emerges . . . as a distinctive [though not subordinate] sphere of 
social action that is centrally implicated in and imbricated with the consti- 
tution and function of political and ideological relations of power and its 
contestation" (108). In his attack on literary practice, Bennett manages to 
circumvent some of the problems of previous Marxist or post-Marxist 
critiques. For instance, he neatly avoids the problems encountered in Terry 
Eagleton's somewhat dubious attempt to dismantle "literature" by target- 
ing, not "literature" itself, but the commitment of literary criticism to an 
aesthetics that, he claims, leads only to the critical malaise of indeterminacy 
(or, as he puts it, "the black-hole effect")) 
Though in basic agreement with Bennett's formulation of literature as 
"a socially differentiated field of textual uses and effects" (which, by now 
it is no doubt obvious, owes a great deal to Foucault), I am troubled by his 
tendency to overstate the fixity of disciplinary boundaries, the more so 
because it authorizes his dismissal of the aesthetic. The problem with 
Bennett's formulation is perhaps not so much that there are no boundaries 
operating among and between the disciplines-clearly, there are-but that 
these boundaries are more vexed than he wants to admit. Despite occasional 
acknowledgments of limited interaction between disciplines, he is, finally, 
committed to a model in which a given discipline is treated as a homogeneous 
entity governed by specific and specifiable rules proper only to itself. Such 
a position leads Bennett to oversimplify concepts like the aesthetic which he 
treats as if its history were coeval only with that of philosophy. Closer 
scrutiny of the various disciplines in which Bennett's critique is invested 
would be necessary in order to establish the convergences, the interactions, 
the common assumptions, and the outright contradictions that would ulti- 
mately delineate the praxis he proposes. And I believe that such a praxis 
would also be less apt to dismiss concepts like the aesthetic which have more 
complicated institutional histories than. Bennett allows for. 
Bennett's formulation of the aesthetic as incompatible with literary 
studies is the most salient difference between his Outside Literature and 
Michael Sprinker's Imaginary Relations. Where Bennett sees the aesthetic 
as a philosophical concept, Sprinker conceives of it as afimmal category that 
cuts across disciplinary boundaries, especially those between literature and 
philosophy. As a formal category, the aesthetic is at odds, not with literary 
criticism, but with history itself. So conceived, this formalist aesthetic 
pushes literary analysis away from the specificity of the work of art (hence 
Sprinker's criticism of the idealism of Marxist aesthetics) and at the same 
time, because it relies on a model of reflection, "forecloses 'the possibility 
of grasping the revolutionary character of art' " (96). This opposition of 3
Collum: Althusser and History: A Review Essay
Published by New Prairie Press
122 S7'CL, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Winter, 1994) 
formalism and history organizes the central problematic of Imaginary 
Relations and brings together a series of readings in which Sprinker explores 
the tensions and contradictions inherent in Marxist aesthetics and attempts 
to reconcile, under the aegis of the aesthetic, both formalism and material- 
ism. 
At first, Sprinker seems to take a skeptical stance toward the aesthetic 
as he mounts a series of arguments that deconstruct previous attempts (by 
such figures as Ruskin, Henry James, Hopkins and Nietzsche, and R.S. 
Crane) to establish the categorical purity of the aesthetic. Though his 
discussion of aesthetic theories is by no means exhaustive (indeed, it is 
somewhat diffuse), Sprinker's analysis does go some distance towards 
demonstrating that the aesthetic, taken as a purely formal category, is 
insupportable. His further discussions of Lukacs, Jauss, and Riffaterre 
establish the need to balance the formalism of Marxist aesthetics with a 
theory of reception powerful enough to account for the apparent interaction 
between the work of art and history. Sprinker's commitment to reception 
theory is, I believe, unfortunate, because it is complicit with materialist 
accounts which represent history as, to use Bennett's phrase, a "set of real 
conditions and relations." This materialism leads him to an aesthetics that 
privileges the particular work of art and its relation to a social or historical 
context over a more general inquiry into the nature of the aesthetic. Sprinker 
never quite resolves the tension between this aspect of his project and his 
commitment to de Man's notion of the aesthetic as "a mode of cognition." 
His adoption, at times, of de Man's more commodious, and I would argue, 
more suggestive version of the aesthetic, allows him to make rather broad 
claims. He writes, for instance, that "the category of the aesthetic is 
intimately involved in the Marxist theory of history at every moment of its 
development" (13). Here, instead of being determined by history, the 
aesthetic actually determines how history itself is conceptualized within 
Marxist theory. Thus, for the de Maniac Sprinker, models of history are 
themselves implicated in the aesthetic structures that they seem to account 
for. 
Where part I of Imaginary Relations challenges the scope of the 
aesthetic, part II (entitled "Marxism") offers a more sustained attempt to 
work through, on a more theoretical level, the problems endemic to Marxist 
accounts of the aesthetic. In this section Sprinker makes his way through the 
work of Fredric Jameson, Jean-Paul Sartre and Perry Anderson in order to 
prepare a space for the "properly materialist theory of art" suggested in the 
first chapter. Such a theory must somehow account for the interaction 
between the aesthetic and ideology, and qualitatively differentiate the work 
of art from mere ideological representation. After dispensing with these 
Marxist theorists Sprinker is finally led to piece together and elaborate on the 
occasional aesthetics of Louis Althusser, relying, finally, on what he refers 
to as "alienation-effect" to bring together the aesthetic and history. In the 
most general terms, this properly aesthetic effect is the mechanism that both 
transforms the "materials of ideologies" that constitute the work of art, and 4
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produces new ideology, and therefore new subjects, through interaction with 
its audience. Sprinker's account of this transformation is inspired by 
Althusser's contention that "consciousness does not accede to the real 
through its own internal development, but by the radical discovery of what 
is other than itself" (quoted 278). If consciousness is structured by ideology, 
the unconscious becomes the site of the "other than itself" Transformation, 
then, is made possible because the work of art and its audience interact in 
such a way that the former becomes the consciousness of the latter and allows 
for transformation of ideology and hence for movement outside the closed 
ci-cle of ideological-historical determination. 
The author's discussion of the "alienation-effect" recalls his earlier 
emphasis on the importance of Rezeptionsasthetik. He argues for a two- 
pronged approach to the aesthetic, where the work of art is the object of two 
modes of investigation: the one a "science of the history of ideology," 
studies the ways in which works of art are used ideologically to maintain 
dominant social relations, the other seeks to understand "scientifically" the 
poetic structures of a given work of art. It seems to me that two major 
problems haunt this project. The first is one of justification. Sprinker 
problematically contends that Marx (and Althusser) argue not for a teleology 
of modes of production but for a differentiating of different forms of the same 
object, a variation on a theme, so to speak, or elaboration through time. But 
this model provides no ground for privileging any "new ideology" produced 
by the work of art. By taking the teleology out of Marxism, Sprinker leaves 
himself no means of justifying the ideological transformation initiated by the 
aesthetic object. And we are left to wonder why this transformation was so 
important to begin with. The second problem is that instead of debunking the 
nature of the aesthetic, the version of formalism that Sprinker embraces in 
the end relegates the aesthetic to the unaccountable processes of the 
unconscious and so reinstates the same mystification of the aesthetic that he 
admits has plagued Marxist accounts of art all along. In order to secure the 
aesthetic, Sprinker must efface it. It seems to me that both these problems 
stem from Sprinker's inability to reconcile reception theory with formalism. 
Being understandably unwilling to locate the site of the aesthetic solely in a 
reader or in a text, Sprinker seems nonetheless to give priority to "the 
materiality of the work of art (i.e., its formal properties as a product of 
aesthetic practice . . .)" (272). Partly because of his ultimate abandonment 
of a broader vision of the aesthetic, the connection which Sprinker insists 
upon between the two categories of formalism and historical determination 
remains, finally, largely rhetorical. 
Though his discussion of the aesthetic as it pertains to the work of art 
falls short of its stated goal (the "clarification of concepts"), Sprinker does 
point, in his more de Manian moments, to another more promising arena in 
which aesthetic theory might be applied-the problem of how to account for 
historical change in general. This problem is eventually framed within a 
context that Bennett ultimately rejects, Kant's formulation of the aesthetic 
(in Critique of Judgement), in which the aesthetic mediates between being- 5
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in-the-world (practical Reason) and rational understanding (pure Reason). 
While Bennett claims that "theories of the aesthetic logically presuppose an 
already elaborated theory of knowledge," it seems to me that Sprinker holds 
out the possibility that the reverse might instead (or also) be true. The 
possibility, once recognized, of deconstructing this dichotomy suggests a way 
out of the materialist dilemma in which Sprinker fmds himself If the 
aesthetic is not the product of an epistemology but rather enables epistemo- 
logical distinctions, then the aesthetic would be implicated in the very 
structure of history itself. Pushing this more comprehensive notion of the 
aesthetic through a rigorous genealogy might produce a useful map of the 
relation between the aesthetic and the disciplines in which it operates. 
Unfortunately, Sprinker approaches this insight obliquely and fails to 
develop or explore this larger epistemological issue, so that it becomes 
difficult to assess his own attitude towards it. But it is nonetheless clear that 
Sprinker's materialism does not offer the only venue in which to exploit the 
tension between history and the aesthetic. 
Ultimately, any analysis that establishes the relation of the aesthetic to 
historical change needs to involve a more detailed study of the aesthetic. 
Instead of falling back on the "materiality" of the work of art, such a study 
would examine the structural necessity of the aesthetic to concepts of history. 
Instead of pragmatically excluding the aesthetic as a pure disciplinary 
concept, a genealogy of "the aesthetic" might determine its disciplinary 
commitments, accidental and otherwise. After all, one need not be a 
proponent of a "history of ideas" to suspect that concepts like the aesthetic 
have histories that cannot be contained within a single discipline. 
Note 
1. Like Stephen Heath, Bennett maintains that regardless of how vehemently 
Eagleton denounces literature as a category, he is still writing from a position 
"inside" the institutional confines of literature-for all Eagleton's efforts, 
"literature" will not simply disappear in a puff of logic. 6
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